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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sam is not offering a new Statement of the Case. For convenience, rather than 
incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case he submitted with his opening brief, he is 
including it verbatim herein in its entirety. 
A. Nature of Case 
Sam Zylstra (hereinafter "Sam" or "Zylstra") was a senior at Boise State University 
(hereinafter "BSU") in February 2010 when he was injured while wrestling as a heavyweight 
(285-pound class) for the university's nationally-ranked wrestling team. He suffered a 
concussion in his first match at the conference championships, was evaluated by a BSU graduate 
assistant trainer during a requested timeout, and was permitted to continue wrestling. He claims 
in this lawsuit that he should not have been allowed to continue wrestling and that he suffered 
grievous further injuries as a result of that additional strenuous physical activity. He made claim 
against BSU and the State of Idaho (hereinafter "defendants") in October 2010, more than 180 
days after suffering injury, and following denial of the claim filed suit against those parties in 
February 2012. 
Defendants denied that Sam was seriously injured during the wrestling tournament and 
also asserted that his claim was untimely, as it was filed more than 180 days after the initial 
concussion was sustained. Sam argued that his delay in filing was excused as he was in no 
condition to discover he had a claim with respect to the post-timeout injuries during the first 
several months after the tournament, asserting that his claim was, in fact, timely filed under 
applicable law. 
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B. Course of Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
In the spring of 2013 defendants filed a motion seeking an order compelling more 
complete disclosures regarding Sam's expert witnesses, and a hearing was held, attended 
telephonically by both of Sam's attorneys on May 9. Tr Vol. 1, pp. 5-31. Defendants argued 
that Sam's list of expert witnesses, which was timely served on April 8, was inadequate as it did 
not provide detailed information about the substantive opinions of the experts, their billing rates, 
or other information required under LR.C.P. 26. The Honorable Cheri Copsey, noting that the 
Order governing the case schedule in this case did not require such detail but also noting that 
there were outstanding unanswered interrogatories requesting such information, declined to mle 
on the Motion to Compel but warned all counsel of the need to answer and supplement answers 
to outstanding discovery. Tr Vol. 1, p. 12, L. 11-20; Tr Vol. 1, p. 23, L. 24-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 24, 
L. 1-9. Sam's counsel recall that they advised the Court and defense counsel of a scheduled 
examination of Sam in Seattle in early June by one of his listed experts (the details of this 
disclosure are disputed, as more fully described below) and believed complete discovery 
responses regarding expected expert testimony could be provided shortly after that June 
appointment without mnning afoul of the judge's warnings. 
On or about June 4, 2013, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting 
that Sam had failed to provide evidence of medical causation and further asserting that his claim 
was not timely. In response to this Motion, Sam provided detailed affidavits from his two 
medical experts, Randall Epperson, Ph.D., and Daniel Brzusek, D.O., stating their opinions that 
the decision to allow Sam to continue wrestling after his initial concussion had likely caused him 
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additional damage. R Vol. 1, pp. 000539-000554; R Vol. 1, pp. 000508-000538. Dr. Epperson 
also opined that Sam's memory was so impaired after the tournament, and his physical 
symptoms of headaches, nausea, photophobia, and fatigue so severe, that he probably was unable 
to evaluate whether he had a claim for months afterward. Additionally, Sam provided affidavits 
from his wife, mother, a close friend and housemate, and that friend's father, reciting their 
observations of his impairment in those early months. R Vol. 1, pp. 000493-000507. 
Following receipt of the affidavits filed in opposition to their Motion, defendants moved 
to strike the medical affidavits in their entirety and also asked the Court to strike large portions 
of the lay witnesses' affidavits, primarily on grounds of hearsay. A hearing was held on August 
8 at which Judge Copsey ruled that Dr. Brzusek's affidavit was provided too late and would thus 
be stricken and that while Dr. Epperson's lengthy report of his initial evaluation of Sam had been 
provided to defense counsel long before their Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, his 
opinion supporting medical causation was a "new" opinion and should have been disclosed 
before the motion was filed. She therefore struck his affidavit, which resulted in her granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the medical causation issue. Tr Vol. 1, pp. 32-117, 
particularly Tr Vol. 1, p. 71, L. 22-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 72, L. 1-21. Sam argued that the opinion was 
not new at all and further argued that defendants had not been surprised or prejudiced by the 
timing of Dr. Epperson's affidavit. With respect to defendants' assertions that the claim was not 
timely, Judge Copsey ruled that the lay witness affidavits, while partly inadmissible, were 
admissible as to the witnesses' personal observations of Sam, and those observations, evaluated 
in light of precedent, including Larson v. Emmett Joint Sch. Dist. No. 221, 99 Idaho 120, 577 
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P.2d 1168 (1978), justified a jury trial on the issue of whether the delay in filing the claim was 
excusable. Tr Vol. 1, p. 82, L. 3-18; Tr Vol. 1, p. 100, L. 4-8; Tr Vol. 1, p. 104, L. 3-21. 
Because Sam had listed only the two medical experts for the issue of medical causation, 
judgment was entered against him on August 15, 2013. At the conclusion of the oral hearing on 
August 8 and prior to entry of the judgment, Sam's counsel moved for a continuance of the trial 
to address the suggestion that defendants had been prejudiced by the timing of Dr. Epperson's 
affidavit. Tr Vol. 1, p. 115, L. 19-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 116, L. 1-9. Judge Copsey denied the motion 
but invited, or seemed to invite, Sam to file "an actual motion because judgment has not been 
entered." Tr Vol. 1, p. 116, L. 14-23. Noting that the Order governing the case proceedings 
required any Motion for Continuance to be in writing, Sam's counsel filed a jOint written Motion 
for Continuance/Reconsideration on August 12, before the judgment was entered. R Vol. 1, pp. 
000654-000724. Hearing on that motion occurred on October 10, Sam's counsel again attending 
by telephone, and Judge Copsey denied both a continuance and the request for reconsideration. 
Tr Vol. 1, pp. 118-167. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On February 26, 2010, Sam Zylstra was wrestling in his first match at the Pac-lO 
tournament, held that year in Davis, California. He was thrown to the mat by his opponent, an 
Oregon State University wrestler he had defeated only a couple of weeks before, and suffered a 
concussion (his forehead took the brunt of his contact with the mat). His coaches called a 
timeout to assess the severity of his injury and to determine whether it was safe for him to 
continue the match. Graduate assistant athletic trainer Andy Cham, who was designated by BSU 
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to evaluate wrestlers' injuries, examined Sam during a 90-second timeout, later noting on a 
report he completed that day that Sam reported a headache and showed signs of confusion and 
dizziness. R Vol. 1, pp. 000335-000355; R Vol. 1, pp. 000341-000342. Mr. Chorn has testified 
that Sam's symptoms cleared before the timeout had expired, and he allowed him to continue 
wrestling. Sam lost that first match but was allowed to participate in the remaining matches of 
the tournament, one more match that day and two the following day, where he fared well enough 
to place fifth and qualify for the NCAA Championships. Roughly two weeks after the 
tournament, when Sam continued to complain of headaches, memory loss, photophobia, and 
other symptoms of concussion, Doctor Scot Scheffel examined him at the trainer's request and 
opined that Sam had suffered a "significant concussion." Dr. Scheffel told Sam he would not be 
cleared to wrestle in the NCAA Championships later that month. R Vol. 1, p. 000492. 
Although Sam to this day believes he has no independent recollection of the timeout, or 
anything that happened for months afterward, he now contends, based on the available evidence, 
that the trainer should not have allowed him to continue wrestling without physician approval, 
which was never obtained prior to conclusion of the tournament. He contends that the extreme 
physical exertion required of him in wrestling after the initial concussion caused further brain 
injury that caused significant and permanent damage. Nearly four years after the tournament, he 
still suffers the effects of brain injury, including extreme anxiety, paranoia, and anti-social 
behaviors that have prevented him from maintaining stable employment and caused severe stress 
to himself and his family. He was unable to complete his studies or obtain his degree at BSU, 
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despite good grades prior to his injuries, and he was medically discharged from the ROTC 
program at the school, terminating his plans to seek a commission in the Army upon graduation. 
The crux of this appeal relates to Sam's medical experts' opinions. Both of them opined 
that Sam should not have been allowed to continue wrestling after his initial concussion, and 
both opined on the basis of reasonable scientific or medical probability or certainty that allowing 
him to continue wrestling caused additional, significant damages, stating that it was likely he 
would have recovered completely from his initial concussion within a couple of weeks if he had 
not suffered further damage by continued wrestling. As set forth in greater detail in the 
Argument section, Sam contends that he had adequately and timely disclosed his experts' 
opinions to defendants. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the discoverability rule set forth in Idaho Code § 6-905 has been 
nullified by the tolling provision of Idaho Code § 5-230 with respect to claim notice 
requirements? 
2. What level of incapacity is required to trigger the tolling or discoverability 
provisions related to claim notice requirements? 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Sam does not seek attorney fees on this appeal. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
A. Dr. Epperson's Opinions 
In their Response Brief, defendants continue to misrepresent the facts in the record. They 
stated in the second paragraph at page 6 of their brief that Sam's expert disclosure "identified 
areas of potential testimony for Epperson and Brzusek but, failed to describe any specific 
opinions addressing medical causation." In fact, Sam's expert disclosure did not suggest only 
that Dr. Epperson would testify about causation. It said that his expected testimony was that 
"defendants breached the applicable standard of care in allowing plaintiff to continue wrestling 
after his initial brain injury during his first match in the Pac-lO wrestling championships on 
February 26, 2010, and that it is likely plaintiff suffered multiple lesser brain injuries during 
subsequent matches, which caused the severe and likely permanent cognitive and behavioral 
deficits plaintiff suffered." R Vol. I, p. 000064. That summary was consistent with the 
preliminary opinions expressed in Dr. Epperson's December 2011 report that the extent of the 
injuries, and their duration, suggested the likelihood of brain injury suffered after Sam's initial 
concussion. 
In the second full paragraph on page 12 of their brief, defendants continue to 
misrepresent the trial court's ruling on their Motion to Compel. They maintain that the judge 
warned Sam's counsel that his expert disclosures (as opposed to his interrogatory answers) "were 
deficient." On the contrary, the judge ruled, consistent with Sam's argument, that the expert 
disclosures did not require the level of detail required by answers to interrogatories. Tr Vol. I, p. 
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12, L. 11-20. If defendants were so sure that the judge ruled Sam's expert disclosures deficient, 
why did they make no effort to include any substantive opinions at all in their expert disclosures 
despite the fact they had Dr. Epperson's December 2011 report and the above-quoted description 
of Dr. Epperson's opinions about causation and on April 19, three weeks before defendants filed 
their own expert disclosures, had received Sam's liability expert's written statement of his 
opinions, the sufficiency of which they have never disputed? R Vol. I, pp. 149-153. 
On page 14 of their response, defendants continue to misrepresent the record regarding 
Sam's experts and what they were or were not asked to do, and when. In the first paragraph, last 
sentence, defendants allege that "neither expert was asked to address the causation issue until 
after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment." In the following paragraph they quote 
argument of undersigned counsel to apparently support their assertion that the disclosures were 
deficient, but they miss the point. The judge did not rule that the expert disclosures were 
deficient but said plaintiff was obligated to provide more information in answering defendants' 
interrogatories, which the undersigned acknowledged he understood. That acknowledgment is 
really irrelevant to whether the expert disclosure provided enough information to defendants to 
apprise them of Dr. Epperson's views on causation, which it did, subject to being amplified when 
the discovery answers were supplemented, which Sam's counsel intended to do as soon as 
possible following Sam's meeting with Dr. Brzusek on June 10. Defendants argued that Sam's 
counsel's statements were an admission Sam "was aware of the medical causation issues in early 
April, 2013, and that expert testimony would be required to establish a prima facia [sic] case of 
negligence." What defendants seem unable to grasp is that Sam's counsel was aware of the 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND CROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8 
medical causation issues before he filed the claim with the State in October 2010 and knew that 
expert testimony would be required to establish causation. But counsel also believed in early 
June 2013 that defendants knew what Dr. Epperson's opinion was about causation, if not through 
his discussion in his December 2011 report then certainly by the disclosure of his expected 
testimony in April 2013, which belief was bolstered by Mr. ColI aer , s suggestion at the Motion to 
Compel hearing on May 9,2013, that he had no problem with Dr. Epperson's opinion. Tr Vol. I, 
p. 9, L. 19-23. 
At the bottom of page 14, defendants reiterate that the "fact" Sam's "experts were not 
asked to provide opinions addressing causation until after BSU's motion for summary judgment 
was filed confirms the trial court's ruling there was no reason the opinions could not have been 
developed and disclosed earlier." First, the allegation that Sam's experts were not asked to 
provide opinions addressing causation until after the motion for summary judgment was filed is 
nonsensical and not supported by the record. As indicated in Sam's opening brief, counsel 
believed defense counsel understood what Dr. Epperson's opinions were on causation and 
further believed, despite understanding that answers to interrogatories needed to be 
supplemented to provide greater detail respecting those opinions, that supplementation was not 
required before Dr. Brzusek's scheduled exam and was not required for any anticipated summary 
judgment motion, which counsel believed would address only the issue of claim timeliness. In 
fact, the record cited by defendants to support their allegations, and particularly Dr. Epperson's 
affidavit, which is misleadingly summarized in footnote 3 on page 14, do not prove that the 
experts were not asked to provide opinions addressing causation until after the motion was filed. 
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Dr. Epperson had expressed his opinion on causation to undersigned counsel long before, and 
counsel had summarized it in the expert disclosure on April 8, 2013. It is true that counsel had 
not previously requested an elaborate written opinion from Dr. Epperson on causation because he 
had no obligation to do so, with its significant attendant costs, and because he intended to 
provide additional detail as soon as Sam had been evaluated by Dr. Brzusek. If undersigned 
counsel had believed defense counsel did not understand that Dr. Epperson would offer an 
opinion consistent with the one stated in the expert disclosure, he would have provided more at 
an earlier date. 
Counsel has never suggested that the opinions could not have been "developed and 
disclosed earlier," but it was believed there was no reason to incur the cost of requesting further 
written opinions, which are not required by the rules, and it was further believed, unfortunately 
given the amount of time and effort required to debate this issue, that supplementation of Sam's 
discovery answers shortly after he was seen by Dr. Brzusek would be sufficient, given counsel's 
belief that discovery was continuing by implied agreement and that counsel and the Court had 
heard his comment, over the phone, on May 9 that his client would not be able to see Dr. 
Brzusek until early June, after which time supplementation would be made. Additionally, 
despite the defendants' expert disclosure deadline having passed on May 10, Sam had received 
from defendants' experts no opinions at all on causation by that date, much less one expressing a 
view on causation different from the one expressed in his expert disclosure. Further, he did not 
receive defendants' neuropsychologist's report until later in May, and it was forwarded to Dr. 
Epperson and Dr. Brzusek on June 2, prior to the filing of defendants' motion for summary 
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judgment, for their review. On May 24 Dr. Brzusek had also provided to undersigned counsel 
opinions regarding standard of care and causation, consistent with Dr. Epperson's, but counsel 
had not disclosed those opinions to defendants before they filed their motion on June 4, believing 
it made sense to await his meeting with Sam and his wife on June 10. 
Near the bottom of page 15 of their response brief, defendants repeat the assertion that 
the "only reason new information was ever provided to Drs. Brzusek and Epperson to address the 
medical causation issue was the fact BSU filed its motion for summary judgment." Even if that 
were true, which it is not, what would have been wrong with Sam's counsel's waiting to provide 
"new information" to his experts only after defendants filed their motion if counsel reasonably 
believed defendants were not contesting his expert's views on causation? 
With all due respect to the judge's authority to manage the deadlines in the case, and 
assuming arguendo that Sam's supplementation was "untimely" as alleged by defendants near 
the middle of page 16 of their response brief, Sam does not agree that the "court would have 
been forced to vacate the trial." Of course, on the apparent assumption without any proof that 
defendants were prejudiced by a disclosure on July 1 that was not new, three months before the 
trial, Judge Copsey asserted at the outset of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment 
that the only way she could accommodate an untimely supplementation would be to continue the 
trial. And it was in response to that statement, following a two-hour hearing that culminated in 
her dismissing plaintiff's claims, that Sam's counsel requested a continuance, despite the fact 
there had been no showing that defendants were prejudiced in any way by the "late" disclosure, 
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and there was absolutely no reason to believe that defendants had been prevented from cross-
examining Sam's experts fully prior to that time had they wanted to do so. 
On page 17 of their brief, defendants quote language from Dr. Epperson's report 
underlining the language that Sam may have sustained additional concussions, further 
information would be helpful, the prolonged post-traumatic amnesia suggests the likelihood of 
subsequent concussions, and the brain dysfunction deficits also suggest more than one 
concussion. R Vol. I, p. 603. Granted, that language would not be sufficient to withstand a 
challenge at trial because it did not include the required statement that his opinions were 
expressed on the basis of reasonable scientific probability or certainty, but he had not been asked 
to be that precise at that time. Further, and importantly, defendants are being very disingenuous 
in suggesting they did not or could not understand what his opinion was at that time. He said 
further information would be helpful, "but prolonged post-traumatic amnesia for four 
months suggests the likelihood of subsequent concussions," and he stated further that the 
"significant current brain dysfunction deficits also suggest more than one concussion." 
(Bold highlighting added). How could defense counsel read that and not believe that Dr. 
Epperson's opinion back in December 2011 was that it was likely Sam had suffered further 
injury because of defendants' having allowed him to continue wrestling after his first 
concussion? What he was saying then is that he would always find additional evidence helpful 
but that the extent of the brain deficits and the duration of the post-traumatic amnesia was not 
consistent with a single concussion. And then, of course, a more explicit, but consistent, 
statement of his views was disclosed in Sam's expert list in April 2013 and then expressed more 
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definitively, but consistently with his 2011 statements, in his affidavit filed on July 1, 2013, a full 
three months before trial. 
On page 19 of the response brief, defendants argue that Dr. Epperson "did not, 
and ... could not, differentiate between Zylstra's initial concussion or possible subsequent 
concussion(s) as the cause of his alleged cognitive deficits." In fact, he could. Granted, he could 
not prove with 100% certainty how Sam would have fared if he had not been allowed to continue 
wrestling after the initial concussion, but it was probable that he would have recovered fully 
within two to three weeks based on well-accepted statistical analyses of concussions. That he 
suffered a very long period of post-traumatic amnesia and significant brain deficits, including 
short-term memory loss, even to the present time was not consistent with a single concussion and 
justified the opinion, expressed with reasonable scientific or neuropsychological certainty in Dr. 
Epperson's June 25 affidavit, that Sam's being allowed to continue wrestling, and the strenuous 
exertion that involved, with or without experiencing what might justify diagnosis of another 
concussion, likely caused severe additional damage not explainable by his initial concussion. 
The science of concussions remains too imprecise to meet the standard defendants are asking the 
Court to require. Sam is not required to prove precisely when he suffered the additional injury or 
injuries that led to his prolonged amnesia and disability. Consistent with what is known about 
the effects of strenuous exertion following too soon after a serious brain injury is sustained, it is 
enough that his expert can say it is probable that his disability and prolonged amnesia were 
caused by the strenuous exercise that followed his initial injury, as it is highly probable that he 
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would have recovered fully from that initial injury within a very short period of time had he been 
withdrawn from the competition and afforded proper rest for healing and recovery. 
In the first full paragraph of page 20 of their brief, defendants argue that undersigned's 
counsel's characterization of Dr. Epperson's report as "comprehensive" at one time and 
"preliminary" at another was somehow significant. Those characterizations meant nothing more 
than that the report was a lengthy detailed report containing a wealth of information and opinions 
about Sam (hence "comprehensive") that provided ample information for preparing a cross-
examination of Dr. Epperson had defendants wanted to depose him before the discovery deadline 
but was nonetheless "preliminary" in the sense he had not been requested to frame his opinions 
in December 2011 in a way sufficient to qualify their admissibility for trial (he had not been 
requested to state his opinions on the basis of reasonable scientific certainty at that time). 
B. Dr. Brzusek's Opinions 
Dr. Brzusek's opinions on causation were new to defense counsel when disclosed on July 
1, 2013,1 but Sam's counsel did not understand them to be untimely because, as previously 
noted, he reasonably assumed defendants had heard his disclosure near the end of the hearing on 
defendants' Motion to Compel on May 9,2013 (because his co-counsel, Mr. Swindler, had heard 
it on the phone in Spokane), that Dr. Brzusek could not see Sam until early June. When 
defendants argue on page 24 that "as of May 9 it was still undecided whether Zylstra would ever 
1 As noted above, Dr. Brzusek had actually formed opinions on causation previously, based on information provided 
by undersigned counsel, and he communicated those opinions to counsel on May 24. Counsel had not disclosed 
them to defense counsel pending Dr. Brzusek's scheduled meeting with Sam on June 10. 
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see Dr. Brzusek," the reference was to a comment by Mr. Swindler, who it had been decided 
would argue the motion. The reason Mr. Whitehead spoke up at the end of the hearing was to 
clarify that unknown, or not recalled, by Mr. Swindler was that by that time Dr. Brzusek had 
planned to see Sam during the latter's scheduled visit to the Seattle area in early June, which had 
been communicated to Mr. Whitehead. 
Sam's counsel do not know how to respond further to the representation by the Court that 
there is nothing on the tape recording of the May 9 hearing to support counsel's assertion he 
disclosed that an appointment for Sam had been planned with Dr. Brzusek in early June. 
Counsel can only reiterate that as an officer of the Court he takes this matter very seriously and is 
as celtain as he can be that the disclosure was made and that he and Mr. Swindler, in discussing 
it afterward, concluded that defense counsel must have heard the disclosure and could not 
reasonably argue in the absence of objection that disclosure of Dr. Brzusek's opinions soon after 
his meeting with Sam would have been untimely. 
On page 28 of their response brief, defendants make the curious argument that Sam could 
not have relied on their July 12 withdrawal of their liability expert to justify disclosing his expert 
opinions on causation on July 1. Sam obviously could not have relied on something that 
happened on July 12 to justify any prior action. Sam's counsel was relying on his perception 
from undocumented conversations with defense counsel and the aforesaid "alleged" disclosure of 
Sam's inability to provide Dr. Brzusek's opinions until after his June 10 appointment, and 
perhaps the sense defendants would want to depose Sam's experts, to justify his belief that 
discovery was still considered open by both sides. That was obviously foolish in retrospect. The 
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e-mail undersigned counsel sent Mr. Collaer on June 3 asking for a call to discuss further 
discovery and mediation was evidence that the belief was genuine, whether wise or not. The 
reference to defendants' July 12 withdrawal of their liability expert and announcement of 
substitution, without any reference to the supposed closing of discovery, was suggested by Sam 
as further evidence that his assumption of an implicit agreement to continue discovery was 
reasonable, not that he had relied on the withdrawal before it had occurred. 
C. Judicial Bias 
Sam is aware of the case law defense counsel cites for the proposition that a claim of 
judicial bias will not be considered on appeal absent a motion to disqualify the judge. Sam asks 
the Court to clarify that this rule must have exceptions for cases like this where there has been no 
trial and no evidentiary hearing and where the claim of judicial bias is based on a ruling on a 
dispositive motion that ends the case. Until the ruling was made on Sam's motion for 
reconsideration, and the transcript was ordered and reviewed, it would have been difficult to 
evaluate whether the judge was, in fact, biased. And at that point, it would seem to have been a 
useless act, and a waste of judiCial and attorney resources, to file a motion to disqualify the judge 
who had just dismissed the case. 
With respect to the merits of the claim of judicial bias, at page 30 defendants quote from 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-556, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474,490-491 
(1994) for the proposition that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a 
bias or partiality motion ... and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of 
favoritism or antagonism required .... " In fact, Judge Copsey's ruling striking Sam's experts' 
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affidavits could be construed as biased on the melits for ignoring, inter alia, the plior 
expressions of Dr. Epperson's opinions on causation, notably, the expert list submitted on Aplil 
8, but it was the way the ruling was announced and justified, with repeated references to the 
communication of Dr. Epperson's opinions as being made 'just before tlial,' that stmck counsel 
as evincing bias when he reviewed the transclipt, as well as a number of other facets of the 
judge's articulation of her mling on the motion and on defendants' subsequent request for costs, 
already discussed in Sam's opening brief, including her gratuitous recitation of facts that had no 
bealing on the motion for costs but constituted fact-finding on issues that had not been the 
subject of testimony or argument. 
On page 31 defendants again assert that the court "stated that Zylstra's expert disclosures 
and discovery responses were insufficient." Sam has no quarrel with that statement as to 
discovery responses, but defendants' repeated assertion that the tlial judge had agreed with them 
that the expert disclosures were insufficient by themselves is simply not reflected by the record. 
Judge Copsey spent a lot of time comparing the federal and state disclosure mles and announced 
that in her opinion the state mles do not yet require the level of detail that is required in 
discovery answers with respect to experts' opinions. Tr Vol. I, p. 11, L. 1-25; Tr Vol. I, p. 12, L. 
1-20. 
Defendants also argue on page 31 that because the tlial judge mled in Sam's favor on 
some issues, she cannot be found to have been biased. Sam would not argue that a review of all 
the judge's mlings in that regard is irrelevant, but the fact remains that the plimary favorable 
ruling issued in Sam's favor on the timeliness of his claim is virtually meaningless when her 
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prior ruling striking the affidavits of his medical experts ended the case for him. Sam remains 
convinced that the trial judge for unknown reasons did not display the kind of disinterest and 
impartiality that is required. 
APPELLANT'S/CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-APPEAL 
Judge Copsey was right to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of claim timeliness because the record raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Sam 
Zylstra was competent to submit a claim to the State more than 180 days before he did so. Sam 
submits that the answer is "no," and the answer is the same however the issue is framed and 
whatever statutory or other legal analysis is applied. A jury could reasonably decide on the facts 
that he filed his claim with the state, as required by Idaho Code § 6-905, within 180 days of the 
date the claim reasonably should have been discovered, thus making the claim timely. A jury 
could also reasonably decide if a different test is applied that Sam was "insane" within the 
meaning of Idaho Code § 5-230 at the time his cause of action accrued justifying tolling of the 
period for filing his claim until his insanity ceased, which under the facts in the record was 
within 180 days of the claim's submission, also making it timely. 
Defendants argue for the insanity test under Idaho Code § 5-230 as discussed in Doe v. 
Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986), versus the accrual test suggested by a line of 
cases including Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 Pold 1162 (Ct. App. 1994) 
that emphasize the date on which the claimant has obtained knowledge of key facts putting him 
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on "inquiry notice" as the date the clock starts running toward the 180-day deadline. This Court 
does not appear to have resolved the appropriate analysis for determining this issue, particularly 
the scope of the insanity test, but Sam respectfully suggests that his claim should be considered 
timely under any test that has been considered and that he is entitled to have a jury decide 
whether he was so incapacitated for a period of time following his injuries at the wrestling 
tournament that it would be a grave injustice to hold that his claim should be barred merely for 
being filed more than 180 days after the incidents that caused the damages for which he seeks 
recovery_ 
The parties disagree substantially about Sam's condition prior to his submission of his 
claim, despite defendants' curious assertion at the hearing on their motion for summary judgment 
that "what they're [Sam's counsel] also trying to argue is he's not really insane or really all that 
incompetent." Tr Vol. I, p. 91, L. 7-9. On the contrary, Sam's counsel have argued that Sam 
was incapacitated in a significant way from the time of the wrestling tournament in February 
2010 well past the date when he submitted his claim to the State. In fact, Sam is still 
incapacitated in a significant way, collecting social security disability for brain injuries that were 
preventable, unable to hold a job, and subject to outbursts of anger and other unpredictable 
behavior consistent with frontal lobe damage to his brain. 
As Judge Copsey correctly ruled, the lay witness affidavits filed by Sam in opposition to 
defendants' motion contained a considerable amount of admissible evidence of the witnesses' 
personal observations of Sam's level of functioning in the months following his injuries. While 
it is true that some of defendants' witnesses who interacted with Sam during that time believed 
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he was functioning normally, the evidence of the witnesses who spent the most amount of time 
with him, and who knew him best, tells a very different story. As outlined by Judge Copsey 
during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Helen Zylstra, Sam's mother, swore by 
affidavit that in the months following the tournament Sam was very anxious. paranoid about 
things. and just didn't seem like himself, and the court admitted those statements. Tr Vol. I, p. 
75, L. 10-13. The statements of Sam's housemate and friend, Jeff Dolifka, repOlting he was 
shocked by Sam's appearance and behavior and characterizations of him as "alternatively loud 
and depressed, coherent and violent - sometimes violent and angry" were also admitted. Tr VoL 
I, p. 76, L. 21-25. Jeff's father's observation that Sam seemed depressed was also deemed 
admissible. Tr Vol. I, p. 77, L. 14-20. And Sam's wife Stephanie's observations of an occasion 
when Sam had returned from school angry because of a headache and frustrated because he 
could not keep up with his homework, were also held admissible, as were her statements that he 
had dropped out of school and been terminated from the ROTC program and her observation 
about his short-term memory loss. Tr Vol. I, p. 78, L. 23-25; Tr VoL I, p. 79, L. 1-11. 
Despite defendants' recitation of Sam's ability to drive a car, engage in other activities of 
daily living, go to school, etc., Sam's lay witness testimony clearly raised genuine issues of 
material fact about the extent of his incapacity. The evidence was that he may have attended 
some classes but could not concentrate and did not complete his assignments, eventually 
withdrawing from school. The evidence was that he drove his car but often did not know why or 
where he was driving and would return to his apartment. The evidence was that he could tell his 
wife he had been injured at the tournament yet not remember telling her or anyone else a short 
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time after doing so. He suffered from raging headaches, photophobia, nausea, sleeplessness, and 
severe nosebleeds. And, importantly, there is no evidence that he had any understanding more 
than 180 days before he submitted his claim that he had displayed signs of concussion during his 
timeout and that the viable claim he had against the State related to injuries he sustained after the 
initial concussion. 
A. Insanity Test 
Defendants insist that Sam's claim is untimely unless he can prove he was "insane" at the 
time his cause of action accrued. If there were no issue about capacity or competence, or 
discoverability of the claim (see below), there would be little doubt that the cause of action 
accrued when Sam was allowed to continue wrestling after showing classic signs of having 
suffered a concussion just before the timeout was called in his first match at the tournament. 
That occurred on February 26, 2010. The analysis as to whether he was insane at the time he 
was allowed to continue wrestling will require this Court to decide the scope of insanity within 
the meaning of that term as used in Idaho Code § 5-230, but Sam submits that he certainly 
wasn't competent or consciously aware of everything that was happening to him at that time or 
for a long period of time thereafter. He has testified that he does not remember the timeout or 
what happened during the timeout, and he does not believe he has any independent recollection 
of what happened for at least several months thereafter. He acknowledges that he may have 
understood he was injured at the tournament, based on what people told him and how he felt, but 
he doesn't believe he remembered independently what happened. 
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Defendants correctly cite Doe v. Durtschi as holding that Idaho Code § 5-230 "applies to 
all procedures integral to commencing actions against private or public defendants, including the 
notice procedure of I.e. § 6-906." Durtschi, supra, 110 Idaho at 479. It is important to note that 
this statute seems to have always before been construed in connection with statutes of limitation 
for filing suit, which in the instant case was complied with; that is, Sam filed suit against the 
defendants within the statutorily prescribed time period of two years after his cause of action 
accrued. There was nothing about the statutory language itself that suggested it should apply to a 
limitation placed on submission of a claim against the State, but in Durtschi the claim had not 
been timely submitted, and because this Court felt barring the minor's claim would be unjust 
under the circumstances, it applied the tolling provision of I.e. § 5-230 to extend the time for 
submitting the claim as well as the time for filing suit. The Durtschi holding suggests the need 
to apply the tolling statute in a way that preserves legitimate claims and to ensure that an 
incapacitated claimant is not barred from making a claim by any requirement of the claims 
process until the incapacity can fairly be said to have been removed. That reasoning should 
apply to Sam's claim as well. 
Defendants cite cases from other states that have no binding authority in Idaho for the 
proposition that "insanity" should be allowed only for those persons who are unable to protect 
their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society, McCarthy v. Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y. 2d 543, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 457, 435 N.E. 2d 1072 (1982), or when they are 
unable to manage their business affairs or comprehend legal rights or liabilities. See 0 'Neal v. 
Division of Family Services, State of Utah, 821 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1991). In the absence of 
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Idaho precedent, Judge Copsey in her ruling looked to an Alaska case for guidance, Adkins v. 
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 609 P.2d 15 (1980), which involved a serious head injury similar to 
the one Sam suffered in the instant case. The affidavit testimony in Adkins suggested that the 
claimant suffered from post-traumatic amnesia, a partial loss of memory, and difficulty 
concentrating, among other disabilities, just as here, and also noted evidence that he was able to 
work for a while after his accident, travel, pursue a worker's compensation claim and retain an 
attorney. By analogy to their arguments in this case, defense counsel would have undoubtedly 
argued in Adkins that the claimant was functioning normally in society, managing his own affairs 
successfully, and could not be considered insane under a tolling statute, but the court in Adkins 
believed the evidence of disability or incapacity was sufficient in that case to raise genuine issues 
of material facts as to whether the claimant should be considered insane. Consistent with the 
spirit of Durtschi, this Court should find that the question of insanity should be left to a jury to 
decide as a question of fact. 
B. Accrual Test: When Should Sam's Claim Reasonably Have Been 
Discovered? 
Idaho case law establishes that a cause of action generally accrues on the occurrence of 
the wrongful act, which in this case would be on February 26,2010, when Boise State's assistant 
trainer allowed Sam to continue wrestling after he had suffered a concussion. The claim notice 
statute, Idaho Code § 6-905, provides that all claims against the State for injury arising from act 
or omission of the State or an employee of the State shall be presented and filed within 180 days 
"from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later." 
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Sam contends in this case that the claim should not have been discovered, could not have been 
discovered by him, and was not discovered until much later, certainly no earlier than May 2010, 
which made his presentation and filing of claim on October 22, 2010, timely. 
One of the seminal cases on this issue was Mallory v. City of Montpelier, supra, a 1994 
Court of Appeals decision cited prominently by defendants in their brief. That case involved a 
young woman who was injured when sliding into second base during a softball game. Five days 
after her accident, she and her husband returned to the softball diamond to investigate the 
accident and concluded it might have been caused by iron or steel bolts that secured the bases to 
the ground, which suggested a claim against the City. She eventually presented a claim against 
the City 182 days after her accident but only 177 days after their inspection of the field and 
discovery of the bolts. 
Citing this Court and its decision in McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 
P.2d 741 (1987) and Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 535 P.2d 1348 (1975), in the context of how 
to interpret the statutory language "reasonably should have been discovered," the Mallory court 
quoted this Court's holding that "knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent 
person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the running of 
the [180]-day period." Mallory, 126 Idaho at 448. In justifying rejection of Ms. Mallory's 
claim, the court stated there was "no question regarding a latent injury, the extent or existence of 
which is unknown at the time of the "wrongful act,"" and said that "no other facts were hidden 
from Mallory that subsequently became known and, therefore, put her on inquiry notice of the 
City's role in her injury." Id., at 448. The court explained that the "statute does not begin 
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running when a person fully understands the mechanism of the injury and the government's role, 
but rather when he or she is aware of such facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to 
inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the incident." Id., at 448. 
Defendants argue the applicability of the McQuillen/Mallory rule, stating Sam was put on 
inquiry notice sufficient to start the 180-day period running from the time of the initial 
concussion or at the latest from March 10,2010, when he was informed by Dr. Scot Scheffel that 
he had suffered a significant concussion, a fact Sam reportedly repeated to others in ensuing 
weeks. But defendants do not persuasively explain how or why a reasonably prudent person 
(assuming, arguendo, Sam could in his concussive state be assumed to have been such), armed 
with the facts known to Sam, would have inquired further into the circumstances surrounding 
"the incident." Unlike Mallory when she was injured, Sam at the time ofthe trainer's decision to 
allow him to continue wrestling did not know he had suffered a concussion or that the trainer had 
observed in him classic signs of concussion during the timeout when it was feasible, and 
necessary, to shut him down. As to Sam the injury was, unlike Mallory's, hidden or latent, and 
more to the point, even after he was told after the tournament he had suffered a concussion, the 
facts known to the trainer during the timeout were hidden from Sam for many months. 
Even ignoring the evidence that Sam had no independent memory of the timeout or 
anything that happened after the timeout for months thereafter, begging the question whether he 
should or could have reasonably discovered his claim even if the trainer had told him 
immediately after the timeout what had happened during the timeout, it makes no sense, and is 
unjust, to apply the inquiry notice standard against Sam as of February 26. And when he was 
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told on March 10 by Dr. Scheffel that he had suffered a significant concussion, he was not told 
that he had shown signs of concussion during the timeout and therefore had no reason to inquire 
further. Again, even giving him much more credit than is due for having the capacity to evaluate 
what had happened to him, in the absence of information about the trainer's observation of 
concussive symptoms during the timeout, Sam had no reason to inquire further, as he certainly 
would not have blamed the university for the only injury he could have known he had suffered, 
one that was due solely to the efforts of his wrestling opponent. 
There is simply no credible evidence in the record that anyone told Sam for at least 
several months (probably not until the summer of 2010, at the earliest), that he had shown signs 
of concussion during the timeout, without which information he had no reason or basis for 
investigating his accident further. If he truly understood, despite evidence of significant post-
traumatic amnesia, short-term memory loss, raging headaches, severe nosebleeds, confusion, 
fatigue, and photophobia, that he had suffered a concussion at the tournament, he certainly had 
no way of knowing for months after the tournament that he likely suffered additional injuries 
from being allowed to continue wrestling. Further, he had no reason to believe that he had a 
claim against the State because as of May, when he mentioned to Dale Dolifka, the Alaska 
lawyer, that he wondered whether the liability waivers he had signed precluded his making a 
claim, there is no evidence that he understood even at that time (within the I80-day period before 
he filed his claim) that his ongoing injuries were caused by his post-timeout wrestling. There is 
certainly no evidence that anyone had told him about his symptoms of concussion during the 
timeout more than 180 days before he submitted his claim, and in the absence of knowledge that 
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the duration of his injuries was highly unusual for a single concussion, there is no basis for 
concluding that he should have conducted further investigation into his injuries, or that any 
reasonably prudent person would have done so, with ample reason to believe that the initial 
concussion explained his symptoms and that because they were caused by an opponent in the 
heat of athletic competition, he would have had no viable legal claim against anyone. He truly 
did discover what was almost certainly the real cause of his ongoing, long-lasting physical and 
mental complaints only when he finally understood that the trainer's decision to allow him to 
continue wrestling after observing signs of his concussion gave rise to a legal claim for which the 
liability waivers did not apply. So contrary to defendants' repeated assertions at pages 9 and 11, 
there most certainly is a dispute whether Sam was on inquiry notice when he sustained his initial 
concussion, or at the moment he continued wrestling. 
As noted above, there is really no evidence that Sam was aware that his being allowed to 
continue wrestling was the cause of his ongoing injuries more than 180 days before he submitted 
his claim, but defendants have bent over backwards to suggest he was on inquiry notice in April 
(anything before April 25 was more than 180 days before he filed). In so doing, defendants have 
repeatedly misrepresented the record in almost comical ways. In the middle paragraph of page 
23 of their brief, defendants noted the evidence that Sam had advised Dale Dolifka he did not 
believe he could pursue a lawsuit against BSU because he had signed a liability waiver. Noting 
as well that this meeting had occurred in "early May" (there is no evidence it occurred in early 
May, but it did occur in May), defendants conclude that showed Sam had first considered 
litigation "sometime before early May." In the first paragraph of page 24, defendants have 
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miraculously converted "before early May" to April of 2010 that Sam had concluded the liability 
waiver might bar his claims. No matter that there is no evidence he met with Dale Dolifka in 
"early" May, no matter that there is no evidence even if he had that he had thought about that 
issue on any prior day, no matter that any prior day still could have been in earlier Mayor 
sometime in April between the 25th and 30th, defendants want to bootstrap themselves from the 
account of Sam's meeting with Dale Dolifka in May to persuade this Court that Sam knew 
enough to sue the State more than 180 days before he submitted his claim. And defense counsel 
made the same arguments at the hearing on their motion for summary judgment, trying to 
extrapolate from a poorly recalled (by both Sam and Mr. Dolifka) meeting in May that it reveals 
evidence that Sam somehow should have reasonably discovered his claim, and had so discovered 
it, prior to April 25. Tr Vol. I, p. 85, L. 5-10, 13-21; Tr Vol. I, p. 99, L. 12-19. 
In support of her decision denying defendants' motion on the timeliness of the claim, 
Judge Copsey referenced Larson v. Emmett Joint School Dist. No. 221, 99 Idaho 120, 577 P.2d 
1168 (1978), Tr Vol. I, p. 101, L. 2-22, finding that it was consistent with the Alaska case, 
Adkins, supra. Tr Vol. I, p. 102, L. 3-11. Defendants argue that Larson has effectively been 
overruled by this Court's decision in Durtschi, supra, overruling Callister (Independent School 
District of Boise City v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975», asserting that because 
Larson did not "depart from" Callister, it should be considered overruled also, as the Larson 
court did not consider applicability of the tolling statute, Idaho Code § 5-230. But Sam submits 
that Larson has not been overruled and, as Judge Copsey suggests, it is instructive on the scope 
of the incapacity that would be sufficient to toll a limitations period, and she ultimately decided 
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that the issue of Sam's incapacity is really a jury question and not one for her to rule on at 
summary judgment. And because Ms. Larson was arguing a physical incapacity to comply with 
the notice requirements, Sam's claim of mental incapacity is much stronger and even under the 
insanity standard should justify decision by a jury of Sam's peers. 
At the bottom of page 20 of defendants' brief, they argue that a plaintiff's experience of 
"symptoms or problems which included periods of memory loss or neurosis does not, unless the 
memory loss arose at the time their claim accrued, create an issue of fact for the jury." Sam's 
claim meets that requirement. He submits, though, that the requirement defendants suggest is 
illogical and unjust, as incapacity should not depend entirely on memory loss at a particular point 
in time but rather on all the circumstances affecting a claimant for a period of time after an injury 
that would reasonably justify a failure to comply with a short limitations period, but Sam meets 
even the test defendants propose. And although defendants cherry-picked certain of Sam's 
behaviors they argue prove he was able to manage his personal affairs prior to April 25, 2010, 
the lay witness testimony presented on Sam's behalf, relied on by Judge Copsey, certainly raised 
genuine issues of material fact about his ability to manage his personal affairs. The people 
closest to him, including his fiancee, mother, and good friend and housemate, who spent much 
more time with him than any of defendants' witnesses, clearly disagree that he was managing his 
personal affairs in any satisfactory way. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Sam submits that defendants' response brief does not make the 
case for affirming the trial court's ruling striking his experts' affidavits and dismissing his 
claims. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the claims should be overturned. The trial 
court's decision denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on the timeliness of Sam's 
claim should be affirmed. The record raises genuine issues of material fact regarding timeliness 
that must be decided by a jury. 
In accordance with the foregoing, Sam requests that his claims be reinstated, the case 
remanded to the district court for trial, and that a new trial judge be assigned for all further 
proceedings. 
[END] 
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